The key legal questions
Nine legal questions in the dispute over Poland's Constitutional Tribunal: oaths, Sejm resolutions, leadership, publication, bench size, European courts.
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Contents — Basics
Level of detail: Basics4 min read
Six disputed questions
Poland's Constitutional Tribunal checks whether laws comply with the Constitution; its 15 judges are elected for nine years by the Sejm, the lower house of parliament.
- Election by the SejmThe Sejm elects each judge individually for nine years (Art. 194(1) of the Constitution); the resolution is published in Monitor Polski.1
- OathThe Status Act (Art. 4) requires an oath "before the President" (wobec Prezydenta). The Constitution says nothing about the oath.2
- Service relationshipUnder Art. 5 of that Act the judge’s service relationship arises when the oath is taken.2
- Admission to adjudicationThe President of the Tribunal assigns cases and organises the judges’ work.3
- Sitting on benchesJudges sit on benches formed under the statute (full bench: at least 11 judges, Art. 37(2)).3
- 2015 Dispute over steps 1–2: who validly elected judges to the seats vacated in autumn 2015, and whether the President had to receive the oath.
- 2026 Dispute over steps 2–4: whether an oath taken in the Sejm rather than before the President creates a service relationship and the right to adjudicate.
The offices of President and Vice-President of the Tribunal are a separate matter: the President of the Republic appoints them from candidates of the General Assembly (six-year term).3
Notes
- [legislation] Konstytucja, Dz.U. 1997 nr 78 poz. 483 (ELI). eli.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [legislation] ELI, Dz.U. 2016 poz. 2073. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [legislation] ELI, Dz.U. 2019 poz. 2393. eli.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
1. Must the President swear in those the Sejm elects?
The Constitution says only that the Sejm elects judges; a statute requires an oath "before the President". In 2015 the Tribunal ruled (K 34/15) that the President must accept it without delay; in May 2026, that he has no such duty (K 3/26). The 2026 bench included two persons elected to seats the Tribunal had held filled in 2015; the government rejects that ruling. The Venice Commission, a Council of Europe advisory body, said in a non-binding opinion that the President should accept oaths without delay.
President Karol Nawrocki swore in two of the six elected in March 2026. His Chancellery says only two seats fell vacant in his term and that the Sejm, among other things, cut the period before the vote. The Sejm's Chancellery replies that the election was effective and such cuts are past practice. No court has ruled on its validity.
2. Can the oath be taken without the President?
On 9 April 2026 six people elected by the Sejm took the oath there (two for the second time); the invited President did not attend. A notary was present and the written oaths went to his Chancellery; the National Council of Notaries says a notarial record does not decide legal effect. Maciej Berek swore there in October. The Sejm and the government regard these oaths as valid; the President and Tribunal President Bogdan Święczkowski do not. The issue is the word "wobec": "in the presence of" or "addressed to"? K 3/26 held it means physical presence. The Venice Commission recommended allowing the oath without the President if he refuses or delays. In May 2026 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) applied an interim measure: the authorities should not obstruct four of these people from taking up duties. The Tribunal disputes its competence here.
3. Can a Sejm resolution "annul" an election?
In November 2015 the PiS-led majority declared void the October 2015 election of five people. In December the Tribunal held (K 34/15) that three had been elected on a constitutional basis and two had not; in 2016 it discontinued the case on the resolutions, treating them as political statements without legal effect. In March 2024 the governing coalition's majority, citing the Tribunal's 2015 rulings and the ECtHR, declared three persons later elected to those seats not to be judges. The Tribunal held that resolution unconstitutional; the government did not publish the ruling, and the European Commission deemed the resolution non-binding.
4. Who leads the Tribunal when its President is contested?
On 30 October 2026 Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, sworn in only in the Sejm, announced that she directs the Tribunal as the person with the longest service (including years in the courts). Her orders impose a one-month "break in official duties" on Święczkowski and Vice-President Bartłomiej Sochański under a provision of the ordinary courts law that, she says, applies via cross-references. This is neither dismissal nor court-ordered suspension. Święczkowski, Sochański and the President's Chancellery reject the orders, citing the two officials' six-year terms. The President says she is not a judge of the Tribunal. No court has ruled.
5. Do unpublished judgments bind?
The Constitution says the Tribunal's judgments bind everyone, are final and must be published without delay. Since March 2024 Donald Tusk's government has not published them, considering the Tribunal improperly composed and citing the Sejm's 2024 resolution and European rulings. The Tribunal holds that non-publication releases no one from applying them. In 2016 Beata Szydło's government did not publish several judgments, including K 47/15, arguing that the Tribunal had bypassed a new statute's procedure.
6. Are rulings by contested benches valid?
In 2021 the ECtHR found that a bench including a person elected in December 2015 to an already filled seat was not a "tribunal established by law". In 2025 the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) found that the Tribunal does not meet the requirements of an independent and impartial court established by law. The Tribunal held in 2021 (K 6/21) that the ECtHR may not assess the election of its judges; it rejects the CJEU's jurisdiction.
Why this matters to ordinary citizens
These questions decide whether the Tribunal's judgments, including on citizens' complaints, are published and applied. State bodies that recognise different benches apply or ignore the same ruling.
Contents — For followers
Level of detail: For followers11 min read
Nine legal questions: positions, provisions, rulings
Status as of 31 October 2026 (04:00 CET).1,2,3 A court judgment is a decision even when contested; a Venice Commission opinion does not bind.
1. Must the President swear in everyone the Sejm elects, or may he choose?
Art. 194(1) of the Constitution gives the election of Tribunal judges to the Sejm and is silent on the oath; Art. 4 of the Status Act requires an oath "before the President".1,2 In K 34/15 (3 December 2015) the Tribunal held the oath provision constitutional only as imposing on the President a duty of "immediate receipt of the oath".4 On 12 May 2026, in K 3/26, a bench including Justyn Piskorski and Jarosław Wyrembak (elected to seats held filled in K 34/15) held Art. 4(1) unconstitutional insofar as it imposes such a duty; Rafał Wojciechowski and Wyrembak dissented; the government does not treat the ruling as binding.5,6,7
On 1 April 2026 President Karol Nawrocki swore in two of the six elected on 13 March (Dariusz Szostek and Magdalena Bentkowska); Head of his Chancellery Zbigniew Bogucki argued that only two seats fell vacant in Nawrocki's term (citing K 34/15: terms run separately) and cited serious procedural failings by the Sejm as to the other four.8,9,10 Bogucki and Krzysztof Bosak said the Sejm missed the nomination deadline, did not keep the seven-day period (voting after two days) and did not present one candidate to MPs.11 The Sejm's Chancellery replies that all candidates were presented, that waiving the period without objection follows past practice and that the President cannot assess the election; no court has ruled on these elections' validity.12 The Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2026)031) found that the President should accept oaths without delay; the President's spokesman said the opinion "has no legal force whatsoever"; Minister Waldemar Żurek, that the President has no veto over those the Sejm elects.13,14
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The President must accept without delay the oath of every person elected | Chancellery of the Sejm; government | Art. 194(1) Constitution; K 34/1512,14 | There is no such duty; the President may withhold | President; his Chancellery; applicants in K 3/26 (PiS MPs) | Art. 4(1) Status Act; K 34/15 (separate terms); K 3/26; alleged breaches of Art. 30 of the Sejm Rules9,10,5,11 | Tribunal: K 34/15 point 5 – duty of immediate receipt; K 3/26 (bench incl. Piskorski and Wyrembak; government rejects it) – no duty; Venice Commission: accept without delay4,5,13 | Unresolved; application Kpt 1/26 pending15 |
2. Can the oath be taken without the President? What does "wobec" mean?
On 9 April 2026 six people elected on 13 March took the oath in the Sejm, addressed to the absent President, with a notary present; the oaths were delivered to his Chancellery that day.16,17 On 14 October Maciej Berek also took the oath in the Sejm (per OKO.press and RMF24, before a notary, with delivery to the Chancellery).18,19,20 Tribunal President Bogdan Święczkowski did not establish a service relationship with four of them without the President's confirmation.17 In Kpt 1/26 the President argues that the Sejm may not organise acts replacing a personal oath; Bogucki's letter of about 26 October says "wobec" means physical presence.21,22 The 2024 Tribunal Acts, never in force, provided an oath deadline and an oath before a notary if the President failed to act; Kp 3/24 (29 July 2025; bench including Piskorski and Wyrembak) held both unconstitutional.23,24 The National Council of Notaries said a notarial record does not produce the legal effects of the recorded event.25 The Venice Commission called the President's role "ceremonial in nature" and recommended, where he refuses or delays, allowing an oath without his physical presence, with form, verification and delivery preserved.13 In Dziurda and Others v. Poland (no. 17392/26) the ECtHR indicated an interim measure: the authorities should not obstruct four applicants from taking up their duties (decision of 5 May, press release of 6 May 2026).26,27
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| An oath in the Sejm, addressed to the President and delivered to him, is effective | those sworn in the Sejm; Chancellery of the Sejm; government | Art. 194(1) Constitution; Arts. 4–5 Status Act28 | "Wobec" means physical presence; the Sejm ceremonies had no legal effect | President; his Chancellery; President of the Tribunal | Art. 4(1) Status Act; K 3/2621,22 | Tribunal: K 3/26 (bench incl. Piskorski and Wyrembak; government rejects it) – physical presence; Kp 3/24 (same two sitting) – 2024 oath deadline and procedure unconstitutional; ECtHR: interim measure; Venice Commission: if he refuses or delays, allow an oath without him, with safeguards5,24,26,13 | Five people not admitted to adjudication; the Tribunal and the President's Chancellery dispute the ECtHR's competence22,29 |
3. Can the Sejm "annul" an election of Tribunal judges by resolution?
On 25 November 2015 the Sejm of the 8th term (PiS majority) adopted five resolutions "on declaring the lack of legal force" of the 8 October 2015 resolutions electing judges (M.P. 2015 items 1131–1135; 270–273 votes for).30,31 In decision U 8/15 (7 January 2016) the Tribunal treated them as political statements with no legal effect on the election.32 On 6 March 2024 the Sejm of the 10th term (coalition majority; 240 to 197) declared 10 resolutions of 2015–2018 (including those of 25 November 2015) void and Mariusz Muszyński, Piskorski and Wyrembak not judges of the Tribunal (M.P. 2024 item 198).33,34 In U 5/24 (28 May 2024) the Tribunal held that resolution incompatible with, among others, Arts. 7, 10, 173 and 190(1) of the Constitution; the judgment was not published.35,36
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The election of 8 October 2015 has no legal force | Sejm of the 8th term (2015) | breach of law in the election30 | An election exhausts the Sejm's power | Ombudsman (in K 34/15) | Art. 194(1) Constitution4 | Tribunal, U 8/15: no legal effect32 | Resolutions declared void by the Sejm in 202433 |
| The 2015–2018 election resolutions have no legal force | Sejm of the 10th term (2024); government | Arts. 7, 194(1) Constitution; Art. 6(1) ECHR; K 34/1533 | The resolution is unconstitutional and has no effect | applicants in U 5/24; Jarosław Kaczyński | Arts. 7, 10, 87(1), 173, 190(1) Constitution35,37 | Tribunal, U 5/24: unconstitutional; ECtHR (Xero Flor, M.L.): see question 6; Venice Commission (2024, as reported): end these terms by statute35,38,39 | U 5/24 unpublished; the European Commission deems the resolution non-binding36 |
4. Who leads the Tribunal when its President is contested?
The Organisation Act sets a six-year term for the President of the Tribunal (Art. 10(2)); the judge with the longest total service leads the Tribunal until a President is appointed (Art. 11(2)) and stands in when neither the Vice-President nor another judge can be authorised (Art. 12(4)).3 Art. 130 of the Law on the System of Common Courts allows "the president of a court or the Minister of Justice" to order an "immediate break in a judge's official duties" for up to a month; against a court president, only the Minister may.40
On 30 October 2026 Anna Korwin-Piotrowska issued orders imposing a break in the duties of Święczkowski and Vice-President Bartłomiej Sochański, citing Art. 12(4) of the Organisation Act and Art. 130 § 1 of the common courts law (via the Supreme Court Act and the Status Act); publication on trybunal.gov.pl proves they exist, not that they take effect.41,42 The orders call the situation a "state of higher constitutional necessity", a notion Ombudsman Sylwia Gregorczyk-Abram called extra-legal, Rzeczpospolita reported.41,43 On 30 October Sochański and the Tribunal's official X account called these actions a "coup d'état"; according to Tribunal spokeswoman Wioletta Ścibor, he regards the orders as non-existent.44,45,46 Overnight on 30–31 October the President, inside the building, told Korwin-Piotrowska, Krystian Markiewicz and Berek that they are not judges of the Tribunal.47 Her Order no. 1/2026 called the General Assembly of Judges for 3 November solely on the 2027 budget.48
Position A
Bogdan Święczkowski remains President of the Tribunal and Bartłomiej Sochański Vice-President.
- Bogdan Święczkowski and Bartłomiej Sochański
- the Tribunal’s official X account (30 Oct, 18:25)
- President Karol Nawrocki and his Chancellery
- First President of the Supreme Court Zbigniew Kapiński
- PiS politicians
- the six-year term of the President of the Tribunal (Art. 10(2) of the Organisation Act)
- no provision allows a judge of the Tribunal to remove its President
- in this side’s view Anna Korwin-Piotrowska is not a judge, as she did not take the oath before the President
Position B
Anna Korwin-Piotrowska directs the Tribunal’s work, and the President and Vice-President are on a one-month "break in official duties".
- Anna Korwin-Piotrowska
- judges Sławomir Patyra, Maciej Taborowski, Magdalena Bentkowska and Maciej Berek
- Prosecutor General Waldemar Żurek (addressed immunity motions to her)
- Prime Minister Donald Tusk
- the judges’ association Iustitia
- Art. 12(4) read with Art. 11(2) of the Organisation Act — substitution by the judge with the longest aggregate service
- Art. 130 of the Law on the System of Common Courts, applied "accordingly" — a break in duties of at most one month
Status: no court or other body has resolved this dispute. The orders of 30 October 2026 have been published on trybunal.gov.pl — this proves their existence and content, not their legal effect, which is disputed.11,12
Notes
- [press] Interia. wydarzenia.interia.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] rp.pl. rp.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] TVN24, 30.10.2026. tvn24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] Polityka. polityka.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] rp.pl, 30.10.2026, 19:59. rp.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [legislation] ELI, Dz.U. 2019 poz. 2393. eli.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] Interia. wydarzenia.interia.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] Polsat News, 23:10. polsatnews.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] TVN24, 18:57. tvn24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] RMF24, 21:10. rmf24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [Constitutional Tribunal] Trybunał Konstytucyjny, „Zarządzenie w sprawie przerwy w czynnościach sędziego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Bartłomieja Sochańskiego” (PDF, skan), 30.10.2026. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [Constitutional Tribunal] Trybunał Konstytucyjny (trybunal.gov.pl), „Zarządzenie w sprawie przerwy w czynnościach sędziego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Bogdana Święczkowskiego” (PDF, skan), 30.10.2026. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Korwin-Piotrowska directs the Tribunal; the President and Vice-President are on a break in duties | Korwin-Piotrowska; Judge Sławomir Patyra; Maciej Taborowski, Bentkowska, Berek | Art. 12(4) Organisation Act; Art. 130 § 1 common courts law with Art. 10 § 1 Supreme Court Act and Art. 19 Status Act41,44 | Święczkowski is President; the orders have no legal existence; Korwin-Piotrowska is not a judge of the Tribunal | Święczkowski; Sochański; the President and his Chancellery | Art. 10(2) and (5) Organisation Act; Arts. 4–5 Status Act (no oath before the President); Art. 126 Constitution44,22,49 | No court has ruled50 | Two competing claims; overnight both sides inside the building47,46 |
5. Do unpublished judgments bind?
Art. 190 of the Constitution: the Tribunal's rulings are universally binding, final and subject to immediate publication.1 In 2016 Beata Szydło's government refused to publish K 47/15, arguing that the Tribunal had bypassed the procedure of the Act of 22 December 2015; it was published in 2018 (Dz.U. 2018 item 1077).51,52 After the Sejm resolution of 6 March 2024 Donald Tusk's government stopped publishing all the Tribunal's judgments; Council of Ministers resolution no. 162 of 18 December 2024 rules out publishing documents of an "unauthorised body".36,53 The Tribunal maintains that non-publication releases no one from applying its judgments.54
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tribunal judgments bind despite non-publication | Tribunal; its President; the President's Chancellery (expects publication) | Art. 190(1)–(2) Constitution54,8 | Documents of an unauthorised body are not published | Donald Tusk's government (since 2024); Beata Szydło's government (2016) | since 2024: Art. 7 Constitution, Sejm resolution of 6 March 2024, resolution no. 162 (citing ECtHR and CJEU rulings); 2016: Act of 22 December 201553,51 | Tribunal, U 5/24: Sejm resolution breaches Art. 190(1) among others; Venice Commission: 2016 – publish K 47/15 to resolve the crisis; 2024 (as reported) – publish, possibly annotated35,55,39 | Judgments unpublished, e.g. SK 68/2527 |
6. Are rulings valid when benches include persons elected to seats held filled in K 34/15?
In K 34/15 the Tribunal held that the election of three judges on 8 October 2015 had a constitutional basis and that of two more (to seats falling vacant on 2 and 8 December 2015) did not; on 2 December 2015 the Sejm elected others to those three seats, including Muszyński, nominated by PiS MPs.4,56 In Xero Flor (7 May 2021) the ECtHR found that a bench including Muszyński was not a "tribunal established by law", and in M.L. v. Poland (14 December 2023; Art. 8 ECHR) noted that Piskorski and Wyrembak filled seats of persons chosen in the same flawed procedure.38,57 In C-448/23 (18 December 2025) the CJEU found that the Tribunal "does not meet the requirements of an independent and impartial court".58 In K 6/21 (24 November 2021) the Tribunal held Art. 6(1) ECHR unconstitutional insofar as it lets the ECtHR assess the election of Tribunal judges; in response to C-448/23 it said the CJEU lacks jurisdiction.59,27
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Benches including these persons are defective | Sejm; Council of Ministers; Szostek and Bentkowska | Art. 194(1) Constitution; Art. 6(1) ECHR33,6 | The benches are lawful; the ECtHR and CJEU may not assess the election of Tribunal judges | Tribunal (K 6/21; Kp 3/24, bench incl. Piskorski and Wyrembak) | Arts. 8(1), 173, 194(1), 195(1) Constitution59,24 | ECtHR: Xero Flor, M.L.; CJEU: C-448/23; Supreme Administrative Court (NSA): III OSK 2528/2138,58,60 | The ECtHR and CJEU found defects; the Tribunal rejects their competence; Wyrembak in office until 30 January 202727,61 |
7. Did Julia Przyłębska's term as President last six years?
Art. 10(2) of the Organisation Act sets a six-year presidential term; Przyłębska was appointed President on 21 December 2016; her judicial term ran to 9 December 2024.62,63 Stanisław Biernat and Batory Foundation experts considered her presidency over in December 2022; Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, that it lasts as long as her judicial term.64 On 1 March 2023 the General Assembly found "no legal or factual grounds" to convene it to select candidates, as six judges had demanded.65
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The term ended in December 2022 | Biernat; six Tribunal judges; Sejm (2024) | Art. 10(2) Organisation Act64,33 | The function lasts until the end of the judicial term | Przyłębska; Prime Minister Morawiecki | no provision identified in the notes65 | No ruling; CJEU (C-448/23): flaws in presenting her candidacy in 201658 | Moot: she resigned on 29 November 202463 |
8. Do ECtHR and CJEU rulings bind the Tribunal?
In P 7/20 (14 July 2021) the Tribunal held that the CJEU acts ultra vires when imposing interim measures concerning the organisation of Polish courts; in K 6/21 it excluded ECtHR review of the election of Tribunal judges.66,59 After the ECtHR interim measure of May 2026 the Tribunal's spokeswoman said the ECtHR cannot rule on Poland's constitutional system; Prime Minister Donald Tusk said the state must remove the obstacles, and Prosecutor General Waldemar Żurek that the measure is immediately enforceable.29
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ECtHR and CJEU rulings bind Poland, including the Tribunal | government; European Commission | duty to comply with the measure; Arts. 2 and 19(1) TEU29,58 | The ECtHR and CJEU may not assess the Tribunal's organisation | Tribunal (P 7/20, K 6/21); its spokeswoman | Arts. 8(1), 90(1), 173 Constitution66,59 | CJEU, C-448/23: breach of, among others, the binding effect of its judgments; ECtHR: interim measure in Dziurda and Others58,26 | Measure not complied with, per the order of 30 October41 |
9. Can a full bench sit with fewer than 11 judges?
Art. 37(2) of the Organisation Act requires at least eleven judges for a full bench, which hears, among others, competence disputes.3 Five people sworn in the Sejm said on 23 October 2026 that dispute Kpt 1/26 cannot be decided without at least 11 judges.67 As of 31 October, 10 of the 15 people elected to the Tribunal had been sworn in before the President; three of them (Szostek, Bentkowska, Patyra) refuse to sit on the current benches.68,6
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A full bench requires at least 11 judges | five people sworn in the Sejm; Bogucki (1 April 2026) | Art. 37(2) Organisation Act67,69 | Art. 37(2) is unconstitutional | Tribunal, according to Prawo.pl | ruling not identified unverified6 | No known European rulings6 | 10 people sworn in before the President68 |
Notes
- [legislation] Konstytucja, ISAP. isap.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] API ELI Sejmu, tekst. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] API ELI, t.j.. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [Constitutional Tribunal] K 34/15, tekst (trybunal.gov.pl). trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Prawo.pl, 12.05.2026. prawo.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Prawo.pl, 13.05.2026. prawo.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] NfP, 13.05.2026. notesfrompoland.com (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] NfP, 1.04.2026. notesfrompoland.com (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Interia. wydarzenia.interia.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Konkret24, „Sam wybrał, od kogo przyjmie ślubowanie…”, 8.04.2026. konkret24.tvn24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Konkret24, „»Krytyczne błędy proceduralne«?…”, 17.03.2026. konkret24.tvn24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Prawo.pl, „Kancelaria Sejmu: Sześcioro sędziów TK wybrano skutecznie”, 3.04.2026. prawo.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] TVN24, „Jest opinia Komisji Weneckiej…”. tvn24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Interia. wydarzenia.interia.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [Constitutional Tribunal] Trybunał Konstytucyjny, „Komentarz w sprawie oświadczenia trójki sędziów Trybunału Konstytucyjnego”, data dodania 19.10.2026. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] TVN24, „Sędziowie TK złożyli ślubowanie w Sejmie i pojechali do TK”, 9.04.2026. tvn24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Prawo.pl, 23.04.2026. prawo.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] rp.pl, 14.10.2026. rp.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] OKO.press, 14.10.2026. oko.press (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] ua.news za RMF24, 15.10.2026. ua.news (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] GazetaPrawna (relacja o Kpt 1/26). gazetaprawna.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] rp.pl, 27.10.2026. rp.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Notes from Poland, 8 X 2024. notesfrompoland.com (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [Constitutional Tribunal] TK, „Judgments – Kp 3/24”, trybunal.gov.pl (EN). trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Prawo.pl, 10.04.2026. prawo.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [ECtHR] ECHR, 6.05.2026. echr.coe.int (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [EU institution] KE RoL 2026, SWD(2026) 921, s. 9 – za notatką 08. data.consilium.europa.eu (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Prawo.pl, 19–20 X 2026. prawo.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] NfP, 6.05.2026. notesfrompoland.com (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] Uchwała Sejmu RP z 25 listopada 2015 r. „w sprawie stwierdzenia braku mocy prawnej” uchwały z 8 października 2015 r. o wyborze sędziego TK (R. Hauser), M.P. 2015 poz. 1131 — M.P. 2015 poz. 1131 (ogłosz. 26.11.2015). eli.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] Głosowania Sejmu VIII kadencji, 2. posiedzenie (25.11.2015), API Sejmu. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [Constitutional Tribunal] Komunikat Biura TK z 29 lutego 2016 r. „w sprawie wyboru sędziów, nowelizacji ustawy oraz OTK”. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] M.P. 2024 poz. 198, eli.gov.pl (PDF). eli.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] Sejm RP, API, term10/votings/7. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] e-prawnik.pl, 12 VI 2024. e-prawnik.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [EU institution] KE, 2024 Rule of Law Report, SWD(2024) 821 final, 24 VII 2024, rozdz. PL, s. 10, przyp. 49. data.consilium.europa.eu (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] OKO.press, 7 III 2024. oko.press (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [ECtHR] HUDOC, nagłówek wyroku. hudoc.echr.coe.int (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] TVN24, 6 XII 2024. tvn24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] arslege.pl, art. 130 PUSP, t.j. Dz.U. 2024 poz. 334. arslege.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [Constitutional Tribunal] Trybunał Konstytucyjny (trybunal.gov.pl), „Zarządzenie w sprawie przerwy w czynnościach sędziego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Bogdana Święczkowskiego” (PDF, skan), 30.10.2026. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [Constitutional Tribunal] Trybunał Konstytucyjny, „Zarządzenie w sprawie przerwy w czynnościach sędziego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Bartłomieja Sochańskiego” (PDF, skan), 30.10.2026. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] rp.pl, „Trybunał Konstytucyjny. RPO: „stan wyższej konieczności konstytucyjnej” to pogląd pozaprawny”, 30.10.2026 21:00, akt. 31.10.2026 03:19. rp.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] rp.pl, 30.10.2026, 19:59. rp.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
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- [press] PAP za portalsamorzadowy.pl, „Prezydent w TK do m.in. Korwin-Piotrowskiej i Berka: nie jesteście sędziami TK”, 31.10.2026 02:19. portalsamorzadowy.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [Constitutional Tribunal] Trybunał Konstytucyjny, „Zarządzenie nr 1/2026 sędzi Trybunału Konstytucyjnego zastępującej Prezesa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 30 października 2026 r.” (PDF, skan), PDF utw. 31.10.2026 00:01. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Interia, 30.10.2026. wydarzenia.interia.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] TVN24, „Trybunał Konstytucyjny - Bogdan Święczkowski zastąpiony przez sędzię Annę Korwin-Piotrowską (Relacja na żywo)”, wpis 01:21. tvn24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
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- [legislation] Wyrok TK z 9.03.2016, K 47/15, ogłoszony w Dz.U. 2018 poz. 1077 (5.06.2018) — Dz.U. 2018 poz. 1077; cyt. w notatce 03_kryzys_2015_2017:21, 294. eli.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
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- [Council of Europe] Komisja Wenecka, CDL-AD(2016)026, opinia o ustawie o TK z 22 lipca 2016 r. (14–15.10.2016), kopia na stronie Sądu Najwyższego Ukrainy. supreme.court.gov.ua (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [parliament] Druk Sejmu VIII kadencji nr 56 z 1 grudnia 2015 r. (lista kandydatów na sędziów TK) — Sejm RP VIII kadencji, druk nr 56; cytowany w notatce 03_kryzys_2015_2017 jako [Druk56]. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [ECtHR] M.L. p. Polsce, nr 40119/21, §§ 15–16, 21, 39, 169. hudoc.echr.coe.int (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [CJEU / EU law] TSUE, komunikat prasowy 157/25, C-448/23. curia.europa.eu (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [Constitutional Tribunal] TK (en), K 6/21. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Rzeczpospolita, 7 XII 2022. rp.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] OKO.press, „Sejm wybrał sześcioro sędziów Trybunału Konstytucyjnego…”, 13.03.2026. oko.press (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] Ustawa z 30.11.2016 (Dz.U. 2016 poz. 2072), tekst ELI/api.sejm.gov.pl. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [encyclopedia] en.wikipedia – Constitutional Tribunal (Poland). en.wikipedia.org (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Rzeczpospolita, „Szóstka sędziów TK nie uznaje Julii Przyłębskiej za prezesa…”, 4.01.2023. rp.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
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- [Constitutional Tribunal] TK (en), P 7/20. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
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- [press] Prawo.pl, 28.07.2026. prawo.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] OKO.press, 1 IV 2026. oko.press (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
Level of detail: Expert48 min read
Scope and method
This analysis covers nine legal questions in the dispute over the Constitutional Tribunal as of 31 October 2026, 04:00 CET (research notes up to about 01:30 CET, supplemented by a freshness check of 31 October). For each question we give the provisions in the version in force on the relevant date, each side's position and the basis it invokes, the rulings and opinions, the interpretation recorded in the sources, and a "who claims what" table.1,2,3 The research notes obtained the 2016 statutes through the Sejm's ELI interface as summaries with short quotations; the wording of the Constitution is paraphrased because the official ISAP database was unavailable.2,1 Findings that rest on press reports are marked as such; a press report does not prove the legal effect of an act.4
Legal framework
- Constitution of 2 April 1997 (Dz.U. 1997 no. 78 item 483): Art. 7 (legality), Arts. 10 and 173 (separation of powers; courts and tribunals as a separate power), Art. 126(2)–(3) (the President ensures observance of the Constitution and acts within the scope set by the Constitution and statutes), Art. 144(3)(21) (prerogative to appoint the President and Vice-President of the Tribunal), Art. 190 (force and publication of rulings), Art. 194(1)–(2) (election of judges by the Sejm; President and Vice-President chosen from candidates of the General Assembly), Arts. 195–197.1
- Act of 30 November 2016 on the Status of Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal (the Status Act; Dz.U. 2016 item 2073; consolidated text Dz.U. 2018 item 1422): Art. 4 (oath before the President; refusal equals resignation), Art. 5 (service relationship upon the oath; the President of the Tribunal assigns cases), Art. 19 (provisions on Supreme Court judges apply accordingly), Arts. 20–23 (immunity), Arts. 24–30 (disciplinary liability; Art. 30 – the common courts law and the Code of Criminal Procedure apply accordingly).2,6
- Act of 30 November 2016 on the Organisation of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Procedure before It (the Organisation Act; Dz.U. 2016 item 2072; consolidated text Dz.U. 2019 item 2393): Art. 8(1)–(2) (two-thirds quorum and presence of the President at the General Assembly), Art. 10 (six-year term of the President), Arts. 11(2) and (5), 12(2)–(4) (substitution), Art. 37 (benches), Art. 38(1) (benches assigned in alphabetical order).3,7
- Implementing Provisions Act of 13 December 2016 (Dz.U. 2016 item 2074): Arts. 17–18 (acting President entrusted by the President of the Republic; cases assigned to judges who took the oath before the President), Art. 19 (publication of rulings issued in breach of the 2015 and 2016 Acts), Arts. 21–22 (candidate selection without the Art. 8 quorum).8
- Law on the System of Common Courts of 27 July 2001 (consolidated text Dz.U. 2024 item 334), Art. 130 § 1–3: immediate break in duties for up to a month, with notice to the disciplinary court within three days.5,9
- The Constitutional Tribunal Acts of 13 September 2024 and their implementing act never entered into force: in Kp 3/24 the Tribunal held their key provisions unconstitutional and inseparable from the whole; the Acts of 30 November 2016 remain in force without substantive amendment.10,7
The questions
1. Is the President obliged to accept the oath of a person elected by the Sejm, and can he choose whom to swear in?
Provisions. Art. 194(1) of the Constitution gives the election of the 15 judges of the Tribunal to the Sejm; the Constitution regulates neither the oath nor the start of the term.1 The oath "before the President" and the service relationship arising upon it derive from Arts. 4–5 of the Status Act; according to the judge rapporteur in K 3/26, the legislature introduced the oath before the President in 1997.2,11 In 2015 Art. 21(1) of the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 25 June 2015 applied.12
Case law of 2015. In K 34/15 (3 December 2015; bench: Sławomira Wronkowska-Jaśkiewicz presiding, Leon Kieres and Marek Zubik as rapporteurs, Stanisław Rymar, Andrzej Wróbel) the Tribunal held in point 5 of the operative part that Art. 21(1) of the 2015 Act, understood otherwise than as imposing on the President a duty to receive without delay the oath of a judge elected by the Sejm, is incompatible with Art. 194(1) of the Constitution.12,13 In its reasoning the Tribunal stated that the President takes no part in the election, that the Constitution gives him no power to refuse, and that only the Tribunal decides on the constitutionality of the basis of an election.14 In K 35/15 (9 December 2015) the Tribunal held that Art. 21(1a) of the amendment of 19 November 2015 (term starting with the oath) and the words "within 30 days of the election" are incompatible with Art. 194(1) of the Constitution; it reasoned that making the term depend on the oath would indirectly involve the President in the election.15,16 In CDL-AD(2016)001 the Venice Commission described the oath as "primarily ceremonial" (para. 108).17
Positions in 2015. President Andrzej Duda, according to press reports summarised by Wikipedia, considered the election of 8 October 2015 flawed and, after K 34/15, argued that swearing in the three persons recognised by the Tribunal would produce more than 15 judges.18 Prosecutor General Andrzej Seremet argued in K 34/15 that the election does not depend on the President's will and that only the elected person's refusal to take the oath has legal effect.12
Case law of 2025–2026. In Kp 3/24 (29 July 2025; full bench of 11: Święczkowski presiding, Sochański rapporteur, Krystyna Pawłowicz, Stanisław Piotrowicz, Justyn Piskorski, Jakub Stelina, Wojciech Sych, Michał Warciński, Rafał Wojciechowski, Jarosław Wyrembak, Andrzej Zielonacki; dissents: Stelina, Sych, Zielonacki; Piskorski and Wyrembak were elected to seats the Tribunal had held filled in K 34/15) the Tribunal held Art. 20(2)–(3) of the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 13 September 2024 (deadline and procedure for the oath) incompatible with Art. 7 read with Art. 126(2)–(3) of the Constitution; the 2024 Acts provided a 14-day deadline and an oath before a notary if the President failed to act.10,19 On 12 May 2026, in K 3/26 (application by a group of PiS MPs represented by Marcin Warchoł; bench: Święczkowski presiding, Sochański rapporteur, Piskorski, Wojciechowski, Wyrembak), the Tribunal held that Art. 4(1) of the Status Act, understood as imposing on the President a duty to receive the oath of a person elected by the Sejm, is unconstitutional; it discontinued the remainder, including Art. 2(2).11,20 The Tribunal reasoned that the oath before the President does not derive from the Constitution but that the legislature could introduce it, and that without the oath office cannot begin.11 Wojciechowski, dissenting, said the Tribunal went beyond the application and departed from its earlier case law; Wyrembak called the ruling a dangerous precedent while accepting that the President may delay an oath in exceptional circumstances.11 The six people elected on 13 March 2026 had sought the recusal of Święczkowski, Piskorski and Wyrembak.11 K 3/26 was delivered by a bench including two persons elected to seats that the Tribunal had held filled in K 34/15; the government does not treat it as binding, and Żurek said there was no judgment.21
Positions in 2026. Bogucki justified accepting only two oaths on the ground that two vacancies arose during Nawrocki's term (after Krystyna Pawłowicz and Michał Warciński) and that 11 judges suffice for a full bench; he cited K 34/15 (each judge's term runs separately).22,23 Announcing on 22 July 2026 the date of Patyra's oath, Bogucki said: "The only oath that can be validly taken is taken before the president."24 On 17 April 2026 President Nawrocki said he had never refused the oath of the four and that the decision rested with the Tribunal.25 The Chancellery of the Sejm (3 April 2026) called the "two vacancies" argument extra-legal and cited precedents of several judges elected on one day.26 Szostek and Bentkowska maintain that all six were elected by the same procedure.27 PiS suspended MP K. Szczucki for the view that the President must swear in all six or none.28 As to Berek, the President's Chancellery questions the verification of his ten years of practice as a legal adviser.29 On 12 May 2026 Święczkowski said that the President should in principle receive oaths but that extraordinary situations may arise.21
Procedural objections to the elections of 13 March 2026. Bogucki and Krzysztof Bosak objected that the nomination deadline was missed, that the 7-day period was shortened (the vote came two days later) and that one candidate was not presented to MPs.30 The period under Art. 30(4) of the Standing Orders of the Sejm was shortened by the Marshal proposing it and, hearing no objection, treating it as adopted.30 The Chancellery of the Sejm replied that all candidates were presented and that waiving the period without objection follows earlier practice (including Stelina's election on 21 November 2019).26 The election resolutions of 13 March 2026 do not state which seat each person fills.27 By comparison, on 2 December 2015 the Sejm rejected motions to adjourn and to refer the matter to committee, and those election resolutions did not identify seats either.31,16
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The President must accept the oath without delay and neither assesses the election nor chooses whom to swear in | Chancellery of the Sejm; government; persons elected on 13 March 2026 | Arts. 194(1) and 7 Constitution; Art. 4 Status Act; point 5 of K 34/1526,35 | There is no duty; the President may withhold in case of procedural flaws or doubts about qualifications | President Nawrocki; his Chancellery (Bogucki); applicants in K 3/26 | Art. 4(1) Status Act; K 34/15 (separate terms); K 3/26; alleged breaches of Art. 30 of the Sejm Rules22,24,30 | Tribunal: K 34/15 point 5 (duty without delay), K 35/15 (term from election), K 3/26 (no duty; bench including Piskorski and Wyrembak; the government rejects the ruling), Kp 3/24 (statutory oath deadline unconstitutional; same two on the bench); Venice Commission: 2016 – oath ceremonial, 2026 – accept without delay12,15,11,10,36 | Unresolved; Patyra sworn in on 28 July 2026; the four elected in March and Berek not sworn in before the President37,38 |
Status as of 31 October 2026. The President has accepted the oath of three of the eight people elected in 2026 (Szostek, Bentkowska, Patyra); application Kpt 1/26 has no known ruling.39,37,40
2. Can an elected person take the oath without the President, and what does "before the President" (wobec Prezydenta) mean?
Facts. On 9 April 2026, in the Column Hall of the Sejm, Markiewicz, Korwin-Piotrowska, Taborowski and Marcin Dziurda (for the first time) and Bentkowska and Szostek (again) took the oath; those swearing for the first time began by addressing the President and swore "before the President of the Republic"; the invited President did not attend; present were the Marshals of the Sejm and Senate and former Presidents of the Tribunal Bohdan Zdziennicki, Andrzej Zoll, Marek Safjan and Jerzy Stępień.41 The documents comprised written oaths with notarised signatures, a notarial record of the ceremony and notarial confirmation of delivery to the President's Chancellery (9 April); on 10 April the four asked the President of the Tribunal to admit them to work.25 On 14 October 2026 Berek, after addressing the President, took the oath in the Sejm and went to the President's Chancellery, stating that he had sworn "in a legally permissible and practically possible form".42 According to OKO.press and RMF24, a notary was present and a notarised text was delivered to the President's Chancellery; note 06a treats the notary's presence as unverified unverified.43,44
Positions. The President of the Tribunal assigned offices and cases only to Szostek and Bentkowska; as to the four, he held that he could not establish a service relationship without confirmation from the President.25 In application Kpt 1/26 (filed in late April 2026) the President asks the Tribunal to declare that the Sejm may not organise acts replacing the personal oath and that the acts of 9 April "produced no legal effects whatsoever"; he argues that the Marshal cannot stand in for the President without an express rule and that a notarial record confers no effect.40,45 In a letter of about 26 October 2026 Bogucki stated that Berek had not entered a service relationship because "before the President" means the President's physical presence.38 A statement that Prawo.pl describes as one by eight judges (about 19 October 2026) holds that the Constitution gives the President no role in the election, that the oath before him is customary, and that an oath in the Sejm with a notarial deed is valid.35 According to a Tribunal communiqué of 19 October, the President of the Tribunal sent a statement of three judges to the disciplinary officer and added it to the file of Kpt 1/26.46 Krystian Markiewicz described the oath as the President's duty towards the nation.25 The National Council of Notaries cited Art. 79 of the Notaries Act: a record documents an event, while courts and authorities assess its effects.47
Venice Commission and ECtHR. Opinion CDL-AD(2026)031 (Opinion No. 1294/2026, adopted on 9 October, published on 13 October 2026), as reported by TVN24, found that the oath has legal significance but that the President's role is ceremonial (para. 62), and recommended (para. 98) applying the oath provisions in line with their purpose and, where the President refuses or delays, allowing the oath without his physical presence, while keeping the prescribed form, proper verification and delivery to him.48,36 According to Interia, the Commission stated that an oath before the President does not entitle him to examine the grounds of the election.49 In Dziurda and Others v. Poland (no. 17392/26) the ECtHR indicated an interim measure for the four applicants; the European Commission gives 5 May 2026 as the date, while the ECtHR press release is dated 6 May.50,51 On 21 April 2026 (communiqué of 22 April) the National Prosecutor's Office opened an investigation covering, among other things, the obstruction of the four; on 23 September 2026 the director of the Tribunal's Chancellery and the head of its security service were charged and pleaded not guilty; no court has ruled on the matter.52,25,53
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The oaths of 9 April and 14 October 2026 (addressed to the President, notary, delivery) are valid and create a service relationship | those who took the oath in the Sejm; signatories of the October statement; Chancellery of the Sejm; government | Art. 194(1) Constitution; Arts. 4–5 Status Act; K 34/15, K 35/1525,35 | "Wobec" means physical presence; the Sejm may not organise substitute acts; powers are not presumed | President (application Kpt 1/26); Bogucki; President of the Tribunal Święczkowski | Art. 4(1) Status Act; Arts. 7 and 126(3) Constitution; K 3/2640,38 | Tribunal, K 3/26 (bench including Piskorski and Wyrembak; the government rejects the ruling): physical presence; Tribunal, Kp 3/24 (same two on the bench): the 2024 statutory oath deadline and procedure, including before a notary, unconstitutional; ECtHR: interim measure (Dziurda and Others); Venice Commission: ceremonial role, oath without physical presence recommended with safeguards11,10,50,36 | Five people without admission to adjudication by the President of the Tribunal; criminal proceedings against Tribunal officials with no court ruling38,53 |
Status as of 31 October 2026. According to the President and the President of the Tribunal, five people (Dziurda, Korwin-Piotrowska, Markiewicz, Taborowski, Berek) have not entered a service relationship; according to the Sejm and the government, they are judges of the Tribunal.38,26
3. Can the Sejm by resolution "annul" or declare ineffective an election of Tribunal judges?
2015. On 25 November 2015 (2nd sitting of the Sejm of the 8th term) the Sejm adopted five resolutions "on declaring the lack of legal force" of the resolutions of 8 October 2015 electing Roman Hauser, Andrzej Jakubecki, Krzysztof Ślebzak, Bronisław Sitek and Andrzej Sokala (M.P. 2015 items 1131–1135); each calls on the President not to accept the oath.57 Votes nos. 23–27 gave 270 to 273 in favour, 40–43 against and 143–149 not voting.58 The notes did not verify the sponsors of the drafts (prints 42–46) in the prints themselves.57 In K 34/15 the Ombudsman argued that the Sejm's power is exhausted upon election and that the resolutions of 25 November 2015 could have a basis only if Art. 137 of the 2015 Act had first been held unconstitutional.12 By decision of 7 January 2016 (U 8/15) the Tribunal discontinued the case: election resolutions are not normative acts, the resolutions "on the lack of legal force" express a political position without effect on the election, and the elections of 8 October 2015 had no defect rendering them non-existent.16 In November 2017 the Tribunal under Julia Przyłębska's leadership stated that the procedure of 8 October 2015 had not been completed because of errors, the resolutions of 25 November and the election of 2 December, and that K 34/15 concerned only the first stage of the procedure.59
2024. The resolution of the Sejm of the 10th term of 6 March 2024 "on removing the effects of the constitutional crisis of 2015–2023 in the context of the activity of the Constitutional Tribunal" (print 226; vote no. 8: 240 for, 197 against, 0 abstentions; M.P. 2024 item 198) cites Arts. 7 and 194(1) of the Constitution, Art. 6(1) ECHR, K 34/15, K 35/15, Xero Flor and M.L.60,61 In points 1–10 it declares adopted in flagrant breach of the law and devoid of legal force: the election resolutions for Sitek and Sokala (8 October 2015), the three resolutions of 25 November 2015, and the election resolutions for Muszyński, Henryk Cioch and Lech Morawski (2 December 2015), Piskorski (15 September 2017) and Wyrembak (26 January 2018); it also states that Muszyński, Piskorski and Wyrembak are not judges of the Tribunal and calls on the Tribunal's judges to resign.60 Minister Maciej Berek said at the time that state bodies should in practice disregard the Tribunal's rulings; Kaczyński said the resolution had no legal effect.62 By judgment of 28 May 2024 (U 5/24; unanimous; read out by Stanisław Piotrowicz) the Tribunal held the resolution incompatible with Art. 7 read with Art. 87(1) and with Art. 10 read with Arts. 173 and 190(1) of the Constitution; the Marshal of the Sejm had asked for discontinuance.63,64 In its 2024 Rule of Law Report the European Commission considered the resolution not legally binding.65
2026. The resolution "on the measures necessary to ensure that the Constitutional Tribunal meets the requirements of a tribunal established by law, independent and impartial" (M.P. 2026 item 299; 235 for, 197 against) states that the Tribunal "has ceased to fulfil its function as an impartial and independent body" and considers it necessary to elect judges to the vacant seats.66,67 The draft was tabled by more than 30 MPs of KO (Civic Coalition), the Left, PSL-TD, Centrum and Polska 2050.67
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The resolutions of 8 October 2015 electing five judges have no legal force | Sejm of the 8th term (25 November 2015) | breach of law in the election (preambles; justifications in prints 42–46 not verified)57 | An election exhausts the Sejm's power | Ombudsman; Prosecutor General Seremet (in K 34/15) | Art. 194(1) Constitution12 | Tribunal, U 8/15: no legal effect; K 34/15: the basis for electing three persons to the seats vacated on 6 November 2015 constitutional, and for two to the seats falling vacant in December not16,12 | The resolutions of 25 November 2015 declared void by the Sejm in 202460 |
| Ten resolutions of 2015–2018 have no legal force, and Muszyński, Piskorski and Wyrembak are not judges of the Tribunal | Sejm of the 10th term (6 March 2024); government | Arts. 7, 194(1) Constitution; Art. 6(1) ECHR; K 34/15, K 35/15; Xero Flor; M.L.60 | The resolution has no legal effect and breaches the Constitution | applicants in U 5/24; PiS (Kaczyński) | Art. 7 with Art. 87(1); Art. 10 with Arts. 173 and 190(1) Constitution63,62 | Tribunal, U 5/24: unconstitutional (unpublished); ECtHR: Xero Flor (a bench including Muszyński was not a tribunal established by law) and M.L.; Venice Commission (2024, as reported): end these persons' terms by statute63,68,69,70 | Declared basis of Council of Ministers resolution no. 162; invoked again by the Sejm in 2026; the European Commission considers it not binding71,67,65 |
Status as of 31 October 2026. In U 8/15 the Tribunal found that the 2015 resolutions had no legal effect on the election, and in U 5/24 it held the 2024 resolution unconstitutional; the government side does not recognise U 5/24, and the Sejm and government continue to rely on the 2024 resolution.16,63,71
4. Who leads the Tribunal when the position of its President is contested?
Provisions. Art. 10(1)–(3) of the Organisation Act: the President of the Republic appoints the President of the Tribunal from candidates of the General Assembly; the term lasts six years and ends earlier with the end of the judge's term, expiry of the mandate or resignation; para. 5 applies this to the Vice-President.3 Art. 11(2): until a President is appointed, the Tribunal's work is directed by the judge with the longest total service (as a Tribunal judge, trainee, assessor or judge of a common court, and in central government posts involving law-making or law-application).3 Art. 12(2)–(4): the Vice-President stands in for the President within the scope of a written authorisation; the President may authorise another judge; where neither the Vice-President nor another judge can be authorised, the judge referred to in Art. 11(2) stands in.3 Art. 8(1)–(2): Assembly resolutions require an absolute majority with at least two-thirds of the judges present and require the presence of the President, except for the resolution under Art. 11(14).3 Art. 130 § 1–3 of the common courts law: a break ordered by a court president or the Minister of Justice where the judge was caught in the act of an intentional offence or where the nature of the act requires immediate removal from duties; against a court president only the Minister may act; the disciplinary court must be notified within three days and either suspends the judge or quashes the order.5 The Status Act contains no provision on suspension or on an immediate break in duties.2
Events. On 30 October 2026 Korwin-Piotrowska, as the judge "with the longest service standing in for the President", issued two unnumbered orders imposing an immediate one-month break in the duties of Święczkowski (including as President) and Sochański (including as Vice-President); scans were published on trybunal.gov.pl, which proves their existence and content but not their legal effect.72,73 The basis cited is Art. 12(4) of the Organisation Act (Dz.U. 2019 item 2393) and Art. 130 § 1 of the common courts law (Dz.U. 2024 item 334) read with Art. 10 § 1 of the Supreme Court Act and Art. 19 of the Status Act; the reasoning also cites Art. 30 of the Status Act.72 By their terms the orders are "immediately effective"; within three working days the competent disciplinary court is to be notified and, within a month, is to suspend the judge or quash the order; the documents do not say which court that is.72,73 The reasoning lists, among others, the failure to convene the General Assembly with the persons elected on 13 March 2026 (leaving no draft 2027 budget), the refusal to admit five people to adjudication and non-compliance with the ECtHR interim measure of 5 May 2026, letting politicians onto the premises, assigning benches out of alphabetical order (including K 3/26 and Kpt 1/26) and delays in cases; it characterises the situation as a "state of higher constitutional necessity".72 The author derives her power from the premise that the President cannot act against himself; she counts her service from the start of her judicial traineeship on 1 September 1995 and states that it is longer than Wojciech Sych's because his Supreme Court service does not count under Art. 11(2).72 The order concerning Sochański charges him with inaction as Vice-President acting under a written authorisation under Art. 12(2) and states that he was appointed Vice-President on 21 February 2025.73 By Order no. 1/2026 Korwin-Piotrowska convened the General Assembly for 3 November 2026 with a single agenda item, the Tribunal's draft revenue and expenditure plan for 2027; the immunity motions are not on the agenda.74 Patyra stated that the dignity of the court and important interests of the service require an immediate break in the duties of the President and Vice-President.75 Earlier, on 15 October 2025, the General Assembly chaired by Vice-President Sochański refused consent to Święczkowski's criminal prosecution; Święczkowski did not vote.76
Counter-positions. The Tribunal's official account on X stated on 30 October that Święczkowski remains President and that Korwin-Piotrowska is not a judge of the Tribunal.4 Sochański said he learned of the break from journalists and knows of no provision allowing such a suspension; Święczkowski said he would demand entry to the building.75 Overnight Sochański was inside the Tribunal building (photograph published by the President's Chancellery); according to the Tribunal's spokeswoman he was in his office and regards the orders as "non-existent documents".77,78 In a communiqué of 20 October 2026 Święczkowski explained that he could not convene the Assembly because of one judge's excused absence, and that two earlier attempts to vote were frustrated by unauthorised persons in the room and by two judges walking out; he sent the draft financial plan to the Marshal of the Sejm.79 Inside the Tribunal building on the night of 30–31 October, President Nawrocki told Korwin-Piotrowska, Krystian Markiewicz and Berek that they are not judges of the Tribunal; Bogucki pointed to Patyra as the only judge among those present.80,81 The First President of the Supreme Court, Zbigniew Kapiński, voiced opposition to the government's actions.82 The President's Chancellery invokes the President's role as guarantor of the continuity of state authority (Art. 126(1)–(2) of the Constitution); by 04:00 on 31 October the President had issued no decision on the Tribunal's leadership.83,78 The Ombudsman, Sylwia Gregorczyk-Abram, called the notion of a "state of higher constitutional necessity" an extra-legal view, while pointing to the circumstances that in her view prompted these actions.84
Position A
Bogdan Święczkowski remains President of the Tribunal and Bartłomiej Sochański Vice-President.
- Bogdan Święczkowski and Bartłomiej Sochański
- the Tribunal’s official X account (30 Oct, 18:25)
- President Karol Nawrocki and his Chancellery
- First President of the Supreme Court Zbigniew Kapiński
- PiS politicians
- the six-year term of the President of the Tribunal (Art. 10(2) of the Organisation Act)
- no provision allows a judge of the Tribunal to remove its President
- in this side’s view Anna Korwin-Piotrowska is not a judge, as she did not take the oath before the President
Position B
Anna Korwin-Piotrowska directs the Tribunal’s work, and the President and Vice-President are on a one-month "break in official duties".
- Anna Korwin-Piotrowska
- judges Sławomir Patyra, Maciej Taborowski, Magdalena Bentkowska and Maciej Berek
- Prosecutor General Waldemar Żurek (addressed immunity motions to her)
- Prime Minister Donald Tusk
- the judges’ association Iustitia
- Art. 12(4) read with Art. 11(2) of the Organisation Act — substitution by the judge with the longest aggregate service
- Art. 130 of the Law on the System of Common Courts, applied "accordingly" — a break in duties of at most one month
Status: no court or other body has resolved this dispute. The orders of 30 October 2026 have been published on trybunal.gov.pl — this proves their existence and content, not their legal effect, which is disputed.11,12
Notes
- [press] Interia. wydarzenia.interia.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] rp.pl. rp.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] TVN24, 30.10.2026. tvn24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] Polityka. polityka.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] rp.pl, 30.10.2026, 19:59. rp.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [legislation] ELI, Dz.U. 2019 poz. 2393. eli.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] Interia. wydarzenia.interia.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] Polsat News, 23:10. polsatnews.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] TVN24, 18:57. tvn24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [press] RMF24, 21:10. rmf24.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [Constitutional Tribunal] Trybunał Konstytucyjny, „Zarządzenie w sprawie przerwy w czynnościach sędziego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Bartłomieja Sochańskiego” (PDF, skan), 30.10.2026. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
- [Constitutional Tribunal] Trybunał Konstytucyjny (trybunal.gov.pl), „Zarządzenie w sprawie przerwy w czynnościach sędziego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Bogdana Święczkowskiego” (PDF, skan), 30.10.2026. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026)
Historical context. In 2021–2022 the Minister of Justice applied Art. 130 of the common courts law to ordinary judges who questioned the status of other judges; the Ombudsman intervened, disputing that these orders were lawful.86 According to Prawo.pl, in 2009 the Tribunal upheld Art. 130 as an "emergency" procedure with two substantive conditions; the notes did not establish the case number unverified.4
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Korwin-Piotrowska, as the person with the longest total service, directs the Tribunal and could impose a break in the duties of the President and Vice-President | Korwin-Piotrowska; Patyra; Taborowski, Bentkowska, Berek | Art. 12(4) with Art. 11(2) Organisation Act; Art. 130 § 1 common courts law with Art. 10 § 1 Supreme Court Act and Art. 19 Status Act; reasoning also Art. 3072,73 | The terms of the President and Vice-President continue; no provision lets a judge impose a break on the President; the orders are "non-existent documents"; Korwin-Piotrowska has no service relationship | Święczkowski; Sochański; the President and his Chancellery; First President of the Supreme Court | Art. 10(2)–(3) and (5) Organisation Act; Arts. 4–5 Status Act (no oath before the President); Art. 126 Constitution75,38,83,77 | No court has ruled; by 04:00 on 31 October no Venice Commission or European Commission position had been found78 | Two competing claims; break per the orders for one month from 30 October 2026; Assembly on 3 November on the 2027 budget only72,74 |
Status as of 31 October 2026, 04:00 CET. Both sides were inside the Tribunal building: Korwin-Piotrowska with persons elected by the Sejm of the 10th term, and Vice-President Sochański, as well as the President and his entourage; trybunal.gov.pl publishes Korwin-Piotrowska's acts. No act resolving the dispute has been issued.80,77,78
5. Do unpublished judgments of the Tribunal bind?
Provisions. Art. 190(1) of the Constitution: the Tribunal's rulings are universally binding and final; para. 2: rulings in matters under Art. 188 must be published without delay in the official journal in which the act was published; para. 3: a provision loses force on publication or on a date set by the Tribunal.1 Art. 19 of the Implementing Provisions Act of 13 December 2016 provided for publication, on the order of the acting President, of rulings adopted in breach of the 2015 and 2016 Acts, except those on acts no longer in force.8 The notes did not establish the wording of Art. 114 of the Organisation Act (publication of rulings).87
2016–2018. On 7 March 2016 Prosecutor General Zbigniew Ziobro wrote to the Tribunal that the government would not publish rulings issued by an "improper" bench; Beata Szydło's government refused to publish K 47/15 (9 March 2016), arguing that the Tribunal had bypassed the procedure of the Act of 22 December 2015.88,17 In CDL-AD(2016)026 the Venice Commission considered publication and implementation of K 47/15 a necessary condition for resolving the crisis (paras. 16, 76, 86).89 K 47/15 was published on 5 June 2018 (Dz.U. 2018 item 1077) under a heading stating that it was issued in breach of the Act of 25 June 2015 and concerns an act no longer in force.90
2023–2026. From 13 December 2023 Donald Tusk's government published the Tribunal's rulings with an explanation where they were issued by an improper bench; after the resolution of 6 March 2024 it stopped publishing all of them.65 Council of Ministers resolution no. 162 of 18 December 2024 on counteracting the negative effects of the constitutional crisis in the judiciary (M.P. 2024 item 1068) states in § 1(1)–(5) that the Tribunal in its current composition cannot perform its tasks under Arts. 188–189 of the Constitution, that Art. 7 also covers publication, and that publishing documents issued by an unauthorised body is not permissible; § 2(7) recommends an annotation for acts of the National Council of the Judiciary and the Supreme Court.71 Unpublished rulings include U 4/24 (10 September 2024), U 2/24 (6 November 2024), U 4/25 (12 November 2025) and SK 68/25 (25 February 2026).91,51 In connection with U 5/24 the Tribunal stated that non-publication does not release anyone from applying its rulings and that relying on the Sejm resolution may give rise to constitutional, criminal or disciplinary liability; Święczkowski asked prosecutors and the disciplinary officer to act against judges refusing to apply the Tribunal's rulings.64,91 In December 2024 the Venice Commission, as reported by Deputy Minister D. Mazur, considered that the Tribunal's judgments should be published, possibly with an annotation.70
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tribunal judgments bind from delivery, and the government must publish them without delay | Tribunal (2016 and 2024); its President Święczkowski; the President's Chancellery | Art. 190(1)–(3) Constitution64,1 | Rulings issued in breach of a statute or by an unauthorised body are not published | Beata Szydło's government (2016); Donald Tusk's government – Council of Ministers (since 2024) | Act of 22 December 2015 (2016); Art. 7 Constitution, Sejm resolution of 6 March 2024, resolution no. 162, whose preamble cites, among others, Xero Flor, M.L., Wałęsa and CJEU rulings (2024)88,71 | Tribunal, U 5/24: Sejm resolution breaches Art. 190(1) among others; Venice Commission: 2016 – K 47/15 must be published; 2024 – publish, possibly with annotation63,89,70 | Tribunal judgments of 2024–2026 unpublished in Dz.U.51 |
Status as of 31 October 2026. The government does not publish the Tribunal's judgments; the notes do not confirm publication of K 3/26.51,21
6. Are rulings by benches including persons elected to seats held filled in K 34/15 valid?
Basis: K 34/15 and K 35/15. In point 8 of K 34/15 the Tribunal held Art. 137 of the 2015 Act compatible with Art. 194(1) of the Constitution as regards judges whose terms ended on 6 November 2015 and incompatible as regards terms ending on 2 and 8 December 2015.12 In point 5 of K 35/15 it held Art. 137a incompatible with Art. 194(1) read with Art. 7 of the Constitution as regards nominating a candidate for a seat vacated on 6 November 2015.15 On 2 December 2015 the Sejm elected Cioch, Morawski, Muszyński, Przyłębska and Piotr Pszczółkowski, nominated by MPs of the PiS parliamentary club (print 56); during the night of 2–3 December the President swore in four of them.31,16 President of the Tribunal Andrzej Rzepliński did not assign cases to those elected to filled seats; Przyłębska, as acting President, assigned them cases from 20 December 2016 under Art. 18 of the Implementing Provisions Act.92,8 Muszyński, Piskorski and Wyrembak sat, among others, in K 1/20 and K 3/21.69,93
European and domestic case law. Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland (no. 4907/18, First Section judgment of 7 May 2021, final on 7 August 2021): a five-judge bench with Muszyński as rapporteur was not a tribunal established by law; the ECtHR noted that the President had not accepted the oath of anyone elected on 8 October 2015.68,94 M.L. v. Poland (no. 40119/21, 14 December 2023): § 172 – Muszyński's participation may in itself undermine the legal force of a judgment; § 173 – Piskorski and Wyrembak were elected to the seats of persons elected in the same flawed procedure; §§ 174–176 – judgment K 1/20 did not meet rule-of-law requirements, the interference was not "prescribed by law", and Art. 8 ECHR was violated.69 CJEU, C-448/23 Commission v Poland (18 December 2025): the Tribunal does not meet the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law because three persons were elected in December 2015 to seats filled in October 2015 (despite K 34/15) and because of irregularities in presenting the candidate for President in December 2016.95 The Supreme Administrative Court (III OSK 2528/21, 16 November 2022) dismissed a cassation appeal by the Chancellery of the Sejm, citing the participation of Muszyński, Piskorski and Wyrembak and consistency with Xero Flor.94 According to Rzeczpospolita, the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw (V SA/Wa 459/18, 20 June 2018) found Muszyński not entitled to sit in the Tribunal; the notes did not establish whether that ruling became final.96
Position of the Tribunal and of domestic bodies. K 6/21 (24 November 2021; application by the Prosecutor General; bench: Przyłębska presiding, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski, Sochański, Sych as rapporteur, Michał Warciński; unanimous): Art. 6(1), first sentence, ECHR, insofar as the term "court" covers the Tribunal, is incompatible with Art. 173 read with Arts. 10(2), 175(1) and 8(1) of the Constitution, and insofar as it entitles the ECtHR to review the lawfulness of the election of Tribunal judges, with Art. 194(1) read with Art. 8(1).97 Kp 3/24 (bench including Piskorski and Wyrembak, whom the Sejm resolution of 6 March 2024 declared not to be judges of the Tribunal): provisions of the 2024 Acts using the notion of a "person not entitled to adjudicate" are incompatible with Arts. 194(1) and 195(1) read with Art. 10 of the Constitution; those Acts provided, among other things, that rulings with such persons were void.10,98 Council of Ministers resolution no. 162: the Tribunal in its current composition cannot perform its tasks under Arts. 188–189.71 The Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2024)035, 6–7 December 2024), as reported, opposed ending the terms of all judges and recommended ending by statute the terms of the persons elected to filled seats.99,70
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The participation of persons elected to seats held filled in K 34/15 makes a bench defective; the Tribunal is not a tribunal established by law | Sejm (2024 and 2026 resolutions); Council of Ministers; Szostek and Bentkowska; European Commission | Art. 194(1) Constitution; Art. 6(1) ECHR; Art. 19(1), second subparagraph, TEU; K 34/1560,20,95 | Review of the election of Tribunal judges belongs solely to the domestic order; the ECtHR and CJEU lack competence; the notion of a "person not entitled" is unconstitutional | Tribunal (K 6/21; Kp 3/24, bench including Piskorski and Wyrembak); its President | Arts. 8(1), 10, 173, 175(1), 194(1), 195(1) Constitution97,10 | ECtHR: Xero Flor, M.L.; CJEU: C-448/23; Supreme Administrative Court: III OSK 2528/21; Venice Commission (2024): end those terms by statute68,69,95,94,70 | The ECtHR and CJEU found defects; the Tribunal rejects their competence; Piskorski's term ended on 18 September 202651,29 |
Status as of 31 October 2026. Of the persons named in the 2024 Sejm resolution, Wyrembak remains in the Tribunal; according to OKO.press his term runs until 30 January 2027.104
7. Did Julia Przyłębska's term as President of the Tribunal last six years?
Provisions and facts. Art. 10(2) of the Organisation Act provides a six-year term for the President of the Tribunal, para. 3 its earlier expiry, among others, at the end of the judge's term, and para. 5 its application to the Vice-President.105 By a decision of 20 December 2016 (M.P. 2016 item 1229) the President of the Republic entrusted Przyłębska with the duties of President of the Tribunal, and by a decision of 21 December 2016 (M.P. 2016 item 1237) appointed her President.106 The Assembly of 20 December 2016, convened at a few hours' notice with 14 judges present and 6 votes cast (Przyłębska 5, Muszyński 1), was held under Arts. 21–22 of the Implementing Provisions Act, which disapplied the Art. 8 quorum.88,8 In C-448/23 the CJEU cited these circumstances as one reason why the Tribunal is not an independent tribunal established by law; earlier, in K 44/16, the Tribunal had held unconstitutional the presentation of candidates without majority support.95
Positions. Biernat, most retired Tribunal judges and experts of the Batory Foundation considered that the President's term ended on 20 December 2022; Prime Minister Morawiecki said the function lasts until the end of the judicial term.107 Sych, Stelina, Muszyński, Zielonacki, Jędrzejewski and Święczkowski demanded that the Assembly be convened to select candidates and sent a copy to the President of the Republic.107 The Assembly convened by Przyłębska on 1 March 2023, with two-thirds of the judges present, resolved that there were no grounds to convene an electoral Assembly, noting that it had not been convened under Art. 11(3); Przyłębska maintained that her function lasted until 9 December 2024; President Duda called the Tribunal "internally divided".108 In 2023 the government spokesman said that Przyłębska was the President of the Tribunal.109 The Sejm resolution of 6 March 2024 stated that the required Assembly resolution was missing and that, even if the appointment were recognised, the six-year term had expired on 21 December 2022; the Ministry of Justice took the same view in December 2024.60,110 Vice-President Muszyński held office from 5 July 2017 to 5 July 2023.111
Links to other rulings. In Kp 3/24 the Tribunal held Art. 14(1) of the 2024 implementing act (early termination of the President's function) incompatible with Arts. 7, 10, 173 and 194(2) read with Art. 144(3)(21) of the Constitution.10 The dispute over the full bench in 2023: Kp 1/23 was decided on 11 December 2023 by a bench of 11 that included only two of the six signatories (Jędrzejewski and Święczkowski).101
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Przyłębska's term as President ended after six years (20 or 21 December 2022); the appointment was also flawed | Biernat, Batory Foundation experts; six Tribunal judges (2023); Sejm (2024); Ministry of Justice | Art. 10(2) Organisation Act; missing Assembly resolution (Sejm)107,60 | The function lasts until the end of the judicial term (9 December 2024) | Przyłębska; Prime Minister Morawiecki; government spokesman; General Assembly of 1 March 2023 | no provision identified in the notes108,109 | No ruling on the term; CJEU (C-448/23): irregularities in presenting her candidacy in 201695 | Moot: resigned on 29 November 2024; Święczkowski President since December 2024111,112 |
Status as of 31 October 2026. The question has no current effect beyond the validity of Przyłębska's acts, including the assignment of benches, which the 2024 Sejm resolution said could be challenged.60
8. Do ECtHR and CJEU rulings and interim measures bind the Tribunal?
Tribunal rulings. P 7/20 (14 July 2021; question of law from the Supreme Court; bench: Piotrowicz presiding, Sochański rapporteur, Jędrzejewski, Piskorski, Stelina): Art. 4(3), second sentence, TEU read with Art. 279 TFEU is incompatible with Arts. 2, 7, 8(1) and 90(1) read with Art. 4(1) of the Constitution insofar as the CJEU imposes ultra vires interim measures concerning the organisation and functioning of Polish courts.100 K 3/21 (7 October 2021; application by the Prime Minister): among others, Art. 19(1), second subparagraph, TEU is unconstitutional insofar as it concerns review of judicial appointments and resolutions of the National Council of the Judiciary.93 K 6/21 – see question 6.97 K 7/21 concerned, according to the title of the Tribunal's web page, review under Art. 6(1) ECHR by national or international courts of laws on the judiciary, court jurisdiction and the National Council of the Judiciary; the notes give its date (10 March 2022), bench and operative part as unverified unverified.113
European rulings. In C-448/23 the CJEU found a breach of Art. 19(1), second subparagraph, TEU and of the principles of autonomy, primacy, effectiveness and uniform application of EU law and of the binding effect of CJEU judgments; Poland cannot rely on constitutional identity against Art. 2 TEU; the action was upheld in full.95,114 The Advocate General's opinion of 11 March 2025 had supported the action.91 In May 2026 the ECtHR indicated an interim measure in Dziurda and Others.50
Positions. The Tribunal's spokeswoman stated that the ECtHR has no competence to rule on Poland's constitutional system and that the Tribunal had received no formal notification; Bogucki said that the Constitution is the supreme law, only the Tribunal can resolve the dispute, and all questions are suspended until the President's application is decided; Prime Minister Tusk said the ECtHR had decided and the state must remove the obstacles; Żurek said the measure is immediately enforceable.103 As to C-448/23, the Tribunal stated that the CJEU lacks jurisdiction and that the judgment does not affect its functioning; its President criticised Poland's support for the Commission's action.51,91 Korwin-Piotrowska's order of 30 October 2026 cites non-compliance with the ECtHR measure as one of its factual grounds.72
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ECtHR judgments and interim measures and CJEU judgments bind Poland, including the Tribunal's organs | government (Tusk, Żurek); European Commission; persons elected in 2026 | duty to comply with the interim measure; Arts. 2 and 19(1), second subparagraph, TEU; primacy of EU law103,95 | The ECtHR and CJEU act beyond their powers when reviewing the Tribunal's organisation or the election of its judges | Tribunal (P 7/20, K 3/21, K 6/21); its spokeswoman; its President; the President's Chancellery | Arts. 2, 7, 8(1), 90(1), 173, 194(1) Constitution100,97 | CJEU, C-448/23: breach of the binding effect of CJEU judgments; ECtHR: interim measure of May 202695,50 | ECtHR measure not complied with, according to the order of 30 October 2026; the Tribunal does not accept CJEU jurisdiction72,51 |
Status as of 31 October 2026. The notes record no extension or modification of the ECtHR interim measure and no new CJEU rulings on the Tribunal after 18 December 2025.50,51
9. Can the full bench function with fewer than 11 judges?
Provisions. Art. 37(2) of the Organisation Act: a full bench consists of at least eleven judges; under Art. 37(1)(1) the full bench hears, among others, competence disputes, cases on political parties, preventive review of statutes (Art. 122(3) of the Constitution) and particularly complex cases (the notes do not confirm the full list).3 Art. 38(1): the President of the Tribunal assigns benches in alphabetical order, taking into account the type, number and order of receipt of cases.3
Numbers. The full bench in Kp 3/24 (29 July 2025) had exactly 11 members.10 After Pawłowicz left (5 December 2025) and Warciński's term ended (20 December 2025), six seats were vacant and nine people sworn in by the President sat in the Tribunal.115,27 After 1 April 2026 there were 11; after 28 June, 10 (end of Zielonacki's term); after 28 July, 11 (Patyra); after 18 September, 10 (end of Piskorski's term).39,37,29 Szostek and Bentkowska (since May 2026) and Patyra (since July 2026) say they will not sit on the current benches; on 24 September 2026 the President of the Tribunal opened disciplinary proceedings against them.20,37,53
Positions. Bogucki: the two oaths of 1 April give 11 judges, the statutory minimum.27 Prawo.pl (13 May 2026) reported that in July 2025 the Tribunal had held Art. 37(2) unconstitutional in a judgment that was not published unverified.20 Szostek and Bentkowska refused to sit in Kpt 1/26, arguing that the bench left out the four elected in March and that the rapporteur (Piskorski) was designated contrary to Art. 38(1) (the order would have been Zielonacki, Bentkowska, Piotrowicz).20 Korwin-Piotrowska's orders of 30 October describe Kpt 1/26 as pending before the full bench with Piskorski as rapporteur, whose term ended on 18 September 2026.72,29 Five people who took the oath in the Sejm stated on 23 October 2026 that there is no competence dispute, because the President has no power over the oath, and that in any case it cannot be decided without at least 11 judges.116
| Claim | Who | Legal basis invoked | Counter-position | Who | Basis invoked | What courts / Venice Commission said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A full bench requires at least 11 judges; Kpt 1/26 and other full-bench cases cannot be decided by a smaller bench | five people sworn in the Sejm; Bogucki (11 as the minimum, 1 April 2026) | Art. 37(1)(1) and (2) Organisation Act116,27 | Art. 37(2) is unconstitutional (according to a report of an unpublished ruling of July 2025) | Tribunal, according to Prawo.pl | case number and content not established unverified20 | The notes record no ECtHR or CJEU rulings or Venice Commission opinions on this point20 | 10 people sworn in by the President, three of whom refuse to sit; 15 judges according to the Sejm37,20,26 |
Status as of 31 October 2026. The notes contain no information on a ruling in Kpt 1/26 or on the bench that would hear it.116,40
Disputed points
- Whether Art. 4(1) of the Status Act imposes on the President a duty to receive the oath: the Tribunal held yes in K 34/15 (for the analogous 2015 provision) and no in K 3/26, delivered by a bench including two persons elected to seats held filled in K 34/15; the government does not treat that ruling as binding.12,11,20
- Whether "before the President" means physical presence: yes according to K 3/26 and the President's Chancellery; no according to those sworn in the Sejm and the Chancellery of the Sejm; the Venice Commission recommends allowing a form without physical presence.11,38,35,36
- Whether a Sejm resolution can deprive an election of effect: in U 8/15 the Tribunal found that the 2015 resolutions had no legal effect, and in U 5/24 it held the 2024 resolution unconstitutional; the Sejm of the 10th term and the government continue to rely on the resolution of 6 March 2024, which invokes K 34/15, K 35/15, Xero Flor and M.L.16,63,71,60
- Whether the orders of 30 October 2026 have a basis in Art. 12(4) of the Organisation Act and Art. 130 of the common courts law: no court has ruled, and the sides present opposing chains of interpretation.72,75
- Whether the Tribunal's judgments left unpublished since March 2024 bind: the Tribunal says yes, and the President's Chancellery expects their publication; the Council of Ministers does not publish documents of an "unauthorised body".64,71
- Whether the Tribunal in its current composition is a tribunal established by law: the CJEU (C-448/23) held that the Tribunal does not meet the requirements of an independent and impartial court established by law, and the ECtHR (Xero Flor) that a bench including Muszyński was not a tribunal established by law; the Tribunal in K 6/21 rejected ECtHR competence and does not accept CJEU jurisdiction.68,95,97,51
- Whether the President may accept oaths selectively (by "vacancies" or qualifications): the President's Chancellery says yes; the Chancellery of the Sejm and the Venice Commission say no.22,26,49
- Whether a full bench may sit with fewer than 11 judges: the text of Art. 37(2) speaks of at least eleven, and the report of an unpublished 2025 ruling has not been verified.3,20
Evidentiary gaps
- Case number of the judgment of 12 May 2026: research note 07 (question 4) treats it as unknown, note 06a as K 3/26 (Prawo.pl: "K 3/2026"; Notes from Poland: "K 323/26", treated as a typo); we use K 3/26.20,21,11
- Date of the ECtHR interim measure: 5 May 2026 according to the European Commission and the order of 30 October, 6 May according to the ECtHR press release and some press; its basis (Rule 39) is a hypothesis in note 06a and given in brackets in note 07; the full text on HUDOC was unavailable.51,50,117
- Opinion CDL-AD(2026)031: note 07 gives the 148th plenary session (9–10 October) and a request of 29 June by the chair of the PACE Monitoring Committee, while note 06a treats the session number and request date as unverified; the content is known only from press reports, and the paragraph numbers (62, 92, 98) come from TVN24.118,48,36
- K 35/15, U 8/15 and K 6/21: note 07 marks them unverified, while notes 03 and 04 rely on Dz.U. 2015 item 2147, the Tribunal communiqué of 29 February 2016 and the Tribunal's website; we follow notes 03 and 04.15,16,97
- End of Przyłębska's six-year term: 20 December 2022 according to Biernat and the experts, 21 December 2022 according to the 2024 Sejm resolution.107,60
- Date of Święczkowski's appointment: 9 December 2024 according to the press, 7 December according to the European Commission's 2025 report; the notes did not find the President's decision.112,91
- Date of the Sejm resolution M.P. 2026 item 299: 13 March 2026 according to TVN24 and portalsamorzadowy.pl, 12 March according to some notes; the M.P. heading would settle it.67,119
- The reported Tribunal ruling of July 2025 on Art. 37(2): note 06a tentatively attributes it to Kp 3/24, but the operative part of Kp 3/24 in note 05 concerns the 2024 Acts, not Art. 37(2) of the 2016 Act.20,10
- The orders of 30 October 2026 are now known from documents published on trybunal.gov.pl (note 06b knew them only from the press), but the break orders carry no number and do not name the disciplinary court, and there is no information on whether it was notified.72,73,4
- The notion of a "state of higher constitutional necessity": note 06b (section 7) attributed it to the Ombudsman; the freshness check of 31 October established that it comes from Korwin-Piotrowska, and that the Ombudsman Sylwia Gregorczyk-Abram (in office since July 2026) called it an extra-legal view.120,84,121
- The statement of about 19 October 2026: Prawo.pl refers to eight judges, the Tribunal's communiqué to three.35,46
- The exact wording of Art. 3 of the Status Act (the ten-year experience requirement contested in Berek's case), Arts. 19 and 26 of that Act, Art. 37(1)(1) and Art. 114 of the Organisation Act and Art. 10 § 1 of the Supreme Court Act is not established.2,3
- The preambles of the resolutions of 25 November 2015 (prints 42–46) and the sponsors of the drafts are not established; nor are the bench and dissents in U 8/15 (Wikipedia gives a different date, 11 January 2016).57,18
- The legal argument of Przyłębska's side in the dispute over her term is not recorded, and the status of Kpt 1/26 as of 31 October 2026 is unknown.108,40
- The reason for the disciplinary proceedings opened on 24 September 2026 differs: note 07 says refusal to adjudicate, note 06a a boycott of the General Assembly.45,53
- Date on which the National Prosecutor's Office opened the investigation into the non-admission of the four: 21 April 2026 according to its communiqué (note 06b), 22 April according to Prawo.pl (note 06a); we use the communiqué's date.52,25
- Presence of a notary at Berek's oath of 14 October 2026: note 06b (OKO.press, RMF24) reports it, note 06a treats it as unverified; the notes found no notarial record.43,44,42
- C-448/23: note 07 describes a Grand Chamber judgment, note 05 treats the bench as unverified; paragraph numbers are not established, apart from paras. 102–103 and 179 cited by Wojciech Sadurski.95,102
Notes
- [legislation] Konstytucja, ISAP. isap.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] API ELI Sejmu, tekst. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] API ELI, t.j.. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Prawo.pl, 30 X 2026. prawo.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] arslege.pl, art. 130 PUSP, t.j. Dz.U. 2024 poz. 334. arslege.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] metadane. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] metadane. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] ELI DU/2016/2074. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [legislation] ELI DU/2001/1070. api.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [Constitutional Tribunal] TK, „Judgments – Kp 3/24”, trybunal.gov.pl (EN). trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [press] Prawo.pl, 12.05.2026. prawo.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
- [Constitutional Tribunal] K 34/15, tekst (trybunal.gov.pl). trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
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- [Constitutional Tribunal] TK, komunikat (EN) po rozprawie w sprawie K 34/15 — Constitutional Tribunal, press release after the hearing in case K 34/15 (3 December 2015); cytowany w notatce 03_kryzys_2015_2017 jako [TK-K34-EN]. trybunal.gov.pl (accessed 31.10.2026) ↩
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How do we know this?
Types of sources this text relies on:
- Legislation: Constitution of 2 April 1997; Status Act and Organisation Act of 30 November 2016; Implementing Provisions Act of 13 December 2016; Art. 130 of the Law on the System of Common Courts (isap.sejm.gov.pl, api.sejm.gov.pl, api.sejm.gov.pl, api.sejm.gov.pl, arslege.pl)
- Court rulings: Tribunal: K 34/15, K 35/15, U 8/15, K 6/21, P 7/20, U 5/24, Kp 3/24, K 3/26; ECtHR: Xero Flor, M.L., Dziurda and Others (interim measure); CJEU: C-448/23; Supreme Administrative Court: III OSK 2528/21 (trybunal.gov.pl, Wyrok TK z 9 grudnia 2015 r., sygn. K 35/15 (Dz.U. 2015 poz. 2147), Komunikat Biura TK z 29 lutego 2016 r. „w sprawie wyboru sędziów, nowelizacji ustawy oraz OTK”, trybunal.gov.pl, e-prawnik.pl, trybunal.gov.pl, prawo.pl, hudoc.echr.coe.int, hudoc.echr.coe.int, echr.coe.int, curia.europa.eu, rp.pl)
- Parliamentary records: Sejm resolutions of 25 November 2015 (M.P. 2015 items 1131–1135), 6 March 2024 (M.P. 2024 item 198) and March 2026 (M.P. 2026 item 299); statement of the Chancellery of the Sejm of 3 April 2026 (Uchwała Sejmu RP z 25 listopada 2015 r. „w sprawie stwierdzenia braku mocy prawnej” uchwały z 8 października 2015 r. o wyborze sędziego TK (R. Hauser), M.P. 2015 poz. 1131, eli.gov.pl, prawo.pl, prawo.pl)
- International bodies: Venice Commission opinions CDL-AD(2016)001, CDL-AD(2016)026, CDL-AD(2024)035, CDL-AD(2026)031; European Commission Rule of Law Reports 2024–2026 (Komisja Wenecka, CDL-AD(2016)001 – polskie tłumaczenie opublikowane przez TVN24, Komisja Wenecka, CDL-AD(2016)026, opinia o ustawie o TK z 22 lipca 2016 r. (14–15.10.2016), kopia na stronie Sądu Najwyższego Ukrainy, coe.int, coe.int, data.consilium.europa.eu, data.consilium.europa.eu, data.consilium.europa.eu)
- Official statements: Council of Ministers resolution no. 162 of 18 December 2024 (M.P. 2024 item 1068); applications and statements of the President and his Chancellery; orders of 30 October 2026 published on trybunal.gov.pl (eli.gov.pl, gazetaprawna.pl, rp.pl, trybunal.gov.pl, trybunal.gov.pl, trybunal.gov.pl)
- Press reports: Reporting by Prawo.pl, Rzeczpospolita, TVN24, Polsat News, Interia, RMF24, OKO.press and Notes from Poland on events in 2023–2026 (prawo.pl, rp.pl, tvn24.pl, wydarzenia.interia.pl, prawo.pl, notesfrompoland.com, portalsamorzadowy.pl)